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THE LAWLESS ADJUDICATOR
Robin West"
I would like to thank the Cardozo School of Law for hosting this
lovely event honoring the work of Richard Weisberg, and particularly
his text, The Failure of the Word. 1 I am honored and quite touched and
humbled by the invitation to address this distinguished group of
scholars. To speak personally for a moment, The Failure of the Word
opened many doors for me. It showed me a sort of writing and
scholarship about law and justice and the great questions of
jurisprudence that I did not know existed: the scholarly attempt, that is,
to find in canonical works of literature philosophical insights about the
meaning of law and the promise of justice. 2 It also suggested, obliquely
at the time, a way of responding to deconstructive challenges to the
coherence of law, to the justice of Codes, and to legalistic virtues,
without resorting to a sort of soul-sucking authoritarianism. 3 Finally,
and most specifically, it built a literary and legal case for the homicidal
criminality of an adjudicator, Captain Vere, who for the most personal
and perverted reasons betrays rather than upholds a legal text, and does
so toward the end of murdering-through a purportedly legal
execution-an innocent man. 4 All of these projects-the call to return
to the literary text, the defense of legalism (or as Weisberg forthrightly
puts it in his paper, his "reverence for law"5), and lastly the "Bill of
Particulars" he brings against Vere, the lawless adjudicator-went
deeply against the grain of two thousand plus years of Western thought,
and certainly the modem and postmodern legal academy. I will
comment in detail only on the last of these contributions: the
characterization of Vere as a lawless adjudicator. Then I will say

• Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
I RICHARD H. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER IN
MODERN FICTION (1984) [hereinafter FAILURE OF THE WORD]'
.
2 Failure of the Word does this by example. Weisberg later argued directly for a return to
the literature in RICHARD H. WEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND
LITERATURE (1992).
3 Again, Failure of the Word does so by example; Weisberg later argues for this directly, in
his important historical work on Vichy France. See RICHARD H. WEISBERG, VICHY LAW AND
THE HOLOCAUST IN FRANCE (1996) [hereinafter VICHY LAW].
4 FAILURE OF THE WORD, supra note 1, at 147-70.
5 Richard H. Weisberg, 20 Years (or 2000?) of Story-Telling on the Law: Is Justice
Detectable?, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 2223, 2225 (2005).
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something very quickly about Weisberg's reverence for legalism and
justice, argued for indirectly in The Failure of the Word, and much
more explicitly here. 6
First, on the "lawless adjudicator." The question I want to pose is
this: Why is it so hard for the legal academy-and the legal
profession-to come to grips with the bare logic of the charge, much
less the case, that Vere acted lawlessly, and therefore criminally, and
indeed murderously, when he willfully distorted the governing law, so
as to execute Billy? Why has this quite specific legal claim not received
more of a hearing? Is it because Weisberg was not sufficiently
considerate in his communication of this idea? On first blush that
seems implausible: It is one thing, after all, to argue syllogistically that
Claggart is Christ, that Claggart is a villain, and that therefore Christ is a
villain-one can see why that claim may require considerate
communication7-but the indictment of the fictional Vere in a
nineteenth century novella? Why has it proven so hard for the academy
to hear Weisberg's claim that Vere is a murderer? Here is the
syllogism: Vere was charged with the duty to uphold the law, he
betrayed the law and his duty to apply it in order to execute an innocent
man, and he did it knowingly, intentionally, and with plenty of malice
aforethought, and for the most profoundly personal, political reasons.
Therefore, Vere is a lawless adjudicator, a dissembler, a criminal, a
murderer.
Does that straightforward legal argument-that an
adjudicator is a man to whom the power to declare what the law is has
been delegated; that an adjudicator might be a criminal, and might
achieve criminal ends, through dissembling, misrepresenting, or
perverting legal texts, and thereby through breaching a trust-itself
require considerate communication? Has our faith in adjudication
reached such absurd heights that the lawless or criminal adjudicator has
become an unthinkable oxymoron? Or, have our expectations dropped
so low that the phrase "lawless adjudicator" has become redundant, so
self evident, that the presentation, the claim, that an adjudicator is
lawless, is just a trite, banal, and unnecessary restatement of a mode of
being always and already present in courts of law?
Briefly, I think, the answer is "yes" to both these questions. The
assertion that an adjudicative claim is both false and politically
motivated is inevitably met these days, in the legal academy, first, with
a two-fold shrug: the first shrug, "Oh, who's to say what's 'false'
anyway," and the second shrug, "Political? So what?-of course it is,
are not they all, are not we all, how could it possibly be otherwise?"
That double-shrug is then followed with a statement of alarm, or at least
6 ld.
7 ld. at 2225.
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consternation, that betrays perhaps a too-fond identification with the
bench: "Surely, an adjudicator can't be lawless simply for putting
forward even a bad legal argument." So, what happens against such
background presuppositions in the legal academy-a background that
combines the deepest imaginable faith in adjudicative wisdom with the
broadest conceivable denial of the possibility of fidelity to law-to the
Weisbergian claim that an adjudicator is lawless? What follows, I
think, is that, except for in Richard Weisberg's scholarship, Captain
Vere and all of his lawless co-conspirators on the bench get off scotfree.
But again, how did we get to this state of affairs? Why are lawyers
and legal academics so oddly inattentive to the problem of the lawless
adjudicator? Weisberg suggests an answer in this paper. Vere's
defenders, he suggests in an aside, have always tended to be dogmatic
authoritarians, citing as an example Richard Posner's near hysterical
defense of Vere' s honor against Weisberg's challenge. 8 Well, that may
be a fair characterization of Posner-I have certainly argued as much9but as influential as the good judge may be, he was, is, and will always
be an exceptional case. He is not representative, at least of the legal
academic trend I am trying to describe. It is just not true that the
legions of legal academics and lawyers-largely left-leaning democratic
contributors to John Kerry's campaign-who have a hard time even
hearing, much less evaluating, Weisberg's depiction of Vere as a
lawless adjudicator, are "dogmatic authoritarians." Quite the contrary:
many of these people consider themselves to be, and in most respects
are, a thorn in the side of the status quo, critical thinkers in all respects,
inquisitive, challenging, non-dogmatic, skeptical, anti-authoritarians.
So, "dogmatic authoritarianism" does not cut it. Somehow these nondogmatic, critical, anti-authoritarians are blinded by their faith in
adjudication, or their skepticism regarding law, or, oddly, both to the
criminality and villainy of the lawless adjudicator. How did we get to
this point?
Let me broaden the question, quickly, and then suggest an answer.
First, to broaden it: Richard Weisberg is not the only legal critic of the
last three, four or five decades to suggest the criminality of lawless
adjudicators. Two examples of recent vintage come to mind, and three
if we go back further, as we ultimately must, back to 1954, to
understand this piece of our current intellectual milieu. But let us start
with the more recent. In an early 1990s capital murder case, \0 the
8 Id. at 2226-27.
9 Robin West, Law, Literature, and the Celebration of Authority, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 977
(1989).
10 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
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Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state's decision to
execute a defendant in spite of the production, post-verdict, of credible
evidence strongly suggestive of the defendant's innocence. Well, said
the Court, whether or not too little, definitely too late: the evidence
pointing to innocence is not timely, and to consider it would be too
burdensome for the state; the execution must go forward. Justice
Blackmun, in dissent, complained that the state's action, and the Court's
affinnance of it, comes "perilously close" to simple murder. 11
That extraordinary remark, I believe, suggests two questions of
relevance here: First, why "perilously close"? We are putting an
innocent man to death, with malice aforethought .... But second, is
Blackmun suggesting that the Justices that did this are "perilously
close" to being murderers? Does a Supreme Court Justice really think
this of his brethren? If so, shouldn't we all be upset? Or, was he
speaking metaphorically, or maybe only speaking of the state
executioners, and surely not of his brethren on the Court. "Considerate
communication," indeed.
My second example is of even more recent vintage, and comes
from an article written by Vincent Bugliosi, an ex-California State's
Attorney, and published by The Nation l2 in the wake of Bush v. Gore. 13
Bugliosi, speaking directly to the scores of constitutional lawyers who
had pronounced the Court's decision in that case to be political and
legally untenable, had this to say:
If, indeed, the Court, as the critics say, made a politically motivated
ruling (which it unquestionably did), this is tantamount to saying,
and can only mean, that the Court did not base its ruling on the law.
And if this is so (which again, it unquestionably is), this means that
these five Justices deliberately and knowingly decided to nullify the
votes of the fifty million Americans who voted for Al Gore and to
steal the election for Bush. Of course, nothing could possibly be
more serious in its enormous ramifications. The stark reality, and I
say this with every fiber of my being, is that the institution
Americans trust the most to protect its freedoms and principles
committed one of the biggest and most serious crimes this nation has
ever seen-pure and simple, the theft of the presidency. And by
definition, the perpetrators of this crime have to be denominated
criminals.
Since the notion of five Supreme Court Justices being criminals is
so alien to our sensibilities and previously held beliefs ... most
readers will find my characterization of these Justices to be
intellectually incongruous. But make no mistake about it, I think my
II

Id. at 446.

12 Vincent T. Bugliosi, None Dare Call it Treason, THE NATION, Feb. 5, 2001, at II.
13

531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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background in the criminal law is sufficient to inform you that
Scalia, Thomas et al. are criminals in the very truest sense of the
word. 14

Bugliosi's article was titled None Dare Call It Treason. Indeed
they do not-but why do they not? Paraphrasing Weisberg: Why the
considerate communication? I will get to my third example in a
moment, but first, let me answer the Bugliosi-Weisberg question. Why
don't they call it treason? Why do we not call them murderers, when
they dissemble and pervert the law for personal and political reasons in
order to legitimate and abet the execution of the innocent; why do we
not call it treason, or at least theft, when they successfully conspire to
steal an election? To get back to fiction: why can we not at least judge
Vere, a fictional adjudicator, and find him guilty? And what good is
law, anyway, or the Rule of Law, if we cannot?
Is it a failure of nerve, a proneness to dizziness? Well, yes,
probably. I do not know anyone in law schools, or anyone period, other
than Vincent Bugliosi (who was, perhaps, toughened up by prosecuting
Charles Manson and his gang thirty years ago) who wants to bring
down on their corporeal being or on their precious institutions the holy
wrath of the organized legal political right.
But there are two more local, more cerebral, less character-based
reasons as well. The first, although the most germane, perhaps, to these
proceedings, I will only mention because I have written on it at length
elsewhere,15 and that is the indeterminacy thesis and its grip on the
modem and postmodem legal imagination. One simply cannot assert
the lawlessness or the criminality of an adjudicator, of all people, if one
simultaneously holds some version of the claim that statements
purporting to say "what the law is" cannot possibly be true or false,
because of the thorough-going radical indeterminacy of legal texts.
There is no actus reus for the larceny, in other words, even if there is
intent: there is no taking, no theft, no treason, in terms of the indictment
Bugliosi wants to bring. There are only arguments, good or bad,
congenial or not. There are no claims of law that could be faithful or
duplicitous. There is no possibility of fidelity to law, if there is no law
sufficiently determinate to command fidelity. If we cannot claim
fidelity, we can hardly claim infidelity, duplicity, disingenuity,
perversion, or distortion of law. Without that major premise, of course,

14 Bugliosi, supra note 12, at 11.
15 See, e.g., Robin L. West, Are There Nothing But Texts in This Class? interpreting the
interpretive Turns in Legal Thought, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1125 (2000); ROBIN L. WEST, REIMAGINING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF FORMAL EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE
RULE OF LAW (2003); Robin L. West, Reconsidering Legalism, 88 MINN. L. REV. 119 (2003).
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Bugliosi's indictment of the Rehnquist Court falls apart, as does
Blackmun's charge, as does, of course, Weisberg's indictment of Vere.
But this is only half of the story. The broad based denial of the
possibility of fidelity or infidelity to law, I think, is clearly but only
partly attributable to the grip of the indeterminacy thesis on the
contemporary legal imagination. The other variable in my equation, A
+ B = C, where C equals the pass we give the lawless adjudicator and B
is the indeterminacy thesis, is faith-and specifically, faith in legal,
adjudicative wisdom, even when, particularly when, adjudication
departs from fidelity. What accounts for this extraordinary faith-a
faith held, clearly, by both those who do and do not hold some version
of the indeterminacy thesis?
There may have been some version of this faith always with us, but
its current form dates, I believe, to Brown v. Board of Education. 16
Brown did two things that matter to Weisberg's eventual thesis. First, it
did what justice required: it declared segregation unconstitutional.
Second, it did so anti-legalistically, at least if we assume Weisberg's
understanding of legalism as in some way a matter of interpreting
binding legal texts in a way that holds true to authorial intent. Brown
did not quite say that "history is bunk," but it came awfully close: the
Court basically proclaimed itself not bound by its own history.17 The
Brown Court rested its conclusion, not on the authority of the past, or on
the authority of the text of the Constitution; but rather, on the pressing
necessity of eradicating a present harm and a present injustice. The
appeal in Brown was to principle and consequence-not the past, not
the text, and not the law. Both prongs of Brown-the doing of justice
and the Court's willful decision to limit its own attentiveness to the past,
and hence, arguably, to law-were central to Brown's legacy: a legacy
that unquestionably includes a revolution, a total transformation, in our
understanding of what justice minimally requires in our social relations
with each other, but also, a transformed generation of liberal, visionary
legal scholars, all of whom were and are committed, to varying degrees
of explicitness and inconsiderateness, to the proposition that justice can
and must be done by courts, through legal institutions and forms,
whether by using, or ignoring, the law itself. Courts, meaning judges,

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See id. at 492-93.
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the
Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We
must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place
in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if
segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the
laws.

16
17

[d.
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meaning adjudicators, morally must do justice, even in the face of
Codes-legal Codes-that seemingly command the contrary. Given
law's indeterminacy, furthermore, the "must" in that sentence all the
more readily implies the "can": the Constitutional phrases guide, but
never command, the wise adjudicator toward a justice, which is
nevertheless unconstrained by law. Thus the aspiration of a liberal
generation of lawyers: Justice can be achieved through wise
adjudication, even in the face of hostile, but thankfully, given
indeterminacy, not binding law.
Brown, then, prompted the third of my three examples of
allegations of lawless adjudication: recall the "Impeach Earl Warren"
signs that sprouted up along highways in southern states in the
aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education. Earl Warren: the lawless
adjudicator. So, in addition to the powerful intellectual and moral
currents drowning out the allegation of a lawless adjudicator quickly
described above, add this potent cultural determinant: liberal legalists of
the past half century do not wan.t to cast their lot with the southern
segregationist movement's attempt to impeach Earl Warren. To
convince us, ultimately, of the criminality of Vere, I would infer from
all of this that Richard Weisberg must not only demonstrate that law
possesses some degree of determinacy, and must somehow cast some
doubt on the liberal legalist's faith in the unconstrained pursuit of
justice through adjudicative institutions, but must also, somehow,
rewrite Brown, so as to bring its self-evidently morally mandatory result
in alignment with Weisberg's own self-evident reverence for law. The
assumption of the last fifty years has been that the justice upheld in
Brown was at odds with the law Weisberg reveres. To rehabilitate law,
then, one must re-write that decision.
Now, a word about the second promise of The Failure of the Word.
In that book indirectly, but in his paper more explicitly, Weisberg puts
forward not only the basis for his indictment of the lawless adjudicator,
but also the basis for his moral embrace of the law Vere eschews.
Weisberg's essay is a moral, political, and intellectual brief for
legalism: for the virtue of fidelity to law, for the goodness of legal
Codes, and the need for individuals and societies to choose their
governing texts wisely and on the basis of sound foundational values. I
found the moral convictions expressed here-the reverence for
legalism, the respect for Codes, and the focus on the Codifier, rather
than the adjudicator, as the lawgiver-to be a welcome and stark
contrast to the reverence for discursive, long-winded, principled
adjudication, on the one hand, and the present and future-oriented
consequentialism so central to the new legal pragmatism, on the other,
that now surrounds me in the legal academy. But we need to tread
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carefully. Much harm, spiritual and otherwise, much injustice, can be
done, is done, and has been done, through undue, unwarranted,
undeserved fidelity to legal texts that may themselves be cruel, riddled
through with ressentiment, abortive of human freedoms, aspirations, and
pleasures, and of course, horribly unjust for the manifest inequality they
express and perpetuate. Then what for legalism?
To take a relatively limited example: even a judge's stance, but
certainly a citizen's stance, toward a criminal code that still criminalizes
crack cocaine at 100 times the degree of severity as powder cocaine,
should perhaps be something less than reverential toward the
legalisms-codified and otherwise-that present him with this
dilemma; likewise, the Slave Codes, the Jim Crow Laws, the Fugitive
Slave Acts, the Apartheid Laws, the Race Laws, and so on and so on
and so on . .. Richard of course knows this: that is why he directs our
attention to the values expressed in foundational law, as well as the
badly neglected virtues of legalistic fidelity.18 But that identification of
foundational values as that which in tum justifies legalist fidelity cries
out for elaboration and elucidation. What are they? They must,
presumably, be something other than the value of legalistic justice itself.
In this day of empire, of nation-building, of transitional administrative
law, of interim constitutions, and so on and so on and so on, such
questions are not fanciful. Legal justice may be-I think it is-in part
about fidelity to a deservedly well-regarded legal text by mature
individuals who have chosen their texts wisely. But it is not only that.
It is also a matter of legal creation in accord with values felt deeply.
But lastly, it is also a matter of knowing when, and at what cost, to
sever the ties to the past, to absorb the cost of being set adrift, when
those foundational texts and the values that inform them prove lethal, or
inhuman, or at odds with the blessed community, or the "human
personality," to borrow a phrase from Martin Luther King's Letter from
a Birmingham Jail; 19 when a legal Code proves itself to be not a law for
free and productive individuals, but a recipe for disaster. I am quite
sure, absurdly confident, that Richard Weisberg, who has so powerfully
reminded us of the forgotten legalist virtues, will prove equally
illuminating when he shines his light of reason on those codified legal
perversions; perversions that evidence not only the ressentiment of the
Captain Veres among us, but of the legal Codes themselves, and will
help us see when our deepest commitments, legalist and humanist both,

18 See Weisberg, supra note 5; VICHY LAW, supra note 3, at 486-529; FAILURE OF THE
WORD, supra note 1, at 114-29.
19 Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter From a Birmingham Jail, reprinted in MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 76 (1964).
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counsel not a robust lawfulness, but the need for either measured, or
inconsiderate, civil disobedience.
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